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NOTE
The NBA's Deal with the Devil:
The Antitrust Implications of the 1999
NBA-NBPA Collective Bargaining
Agreement
Dan Messeloff*
INTRODUCTION
A frigid dawn had not yet begun to rise when a group of weary
negotiators concluded an eleven-hour, eleventh-hour meeting high
above the streets of midtown Manhattan. At 7:00 p.m. on January
6, 1999, six men gathered to decide the fate of what had become,
essentially over the course of the previous decade, an immensely
successful element of American popular culture - professional
basketball.' At approximately 5:30 a.m. on January 7, 1999, an
agreement was finally reached between the representatives of the
National Basketball Association ("the NBA" or "the league") and
of the National Basketball Players' Association ("the NBPA" or
"the union"), the union representing players in the NBA. The
landmark agreement ended a six-month lockout and rescued the
NBA from becoming the first professional sports league to cancel
an entire season due to labor strife.' The agreement curtailed strike-
* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Fordham University School of Law. The author thanks Rosa
Pietanza and Thaddeus Tracy for their insight and guidance.
1. In addition to the National Basketball Association, the Continental Basketball
Association ("CBA") is another professional basketball league. However, the CBA is the
NBA's "minor league." The league functions as the "Official Developmental League" for
the NBA, and trains players for the NBA. In 1998-99, 63 players were called up from the
CBA to the NBA. See CBA History, (visited April 17, 2000)
<www.cbahoops.conhistory/index.shtml>.
2. See Mike Wise, With Little Time on Clock, N.B.A. and Players Settle, N. Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 1999, at Al.
3. See Stefan Fatsis, NBA, Players Reach Accord, Saving Season, WALL ST. J., Jan.
7, 1999, at A3.
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related losses at $1 billion in revenue for owners and more than
$500 million in salaries for players, and permitted both parties to
vie for the remaining $1 billion in estimated revenue still to be
earned in the shortened season.4 Yet while the NBA's settlement
certainly offered immediate, short-term benefits, most notably the
restoration of the 1999 NBA season, the consequences of that
agreement - anticompetitive price-fixing of players' salaries - set a
dangerous precedent which reaches far beyond a single basketball
season. In fact, the effects of the NBA's agreement go so far as to
undermine labor relations between all players' unions and leagues,
and the legal relationship as a whole between athletes and their
teams in all professional sports.
The agreed-upon contract came one day before NBA Commis-
sioner David Stem's self-imposed deadline, at which point he said
he would recommend to the owners of the 29 NBA teams that the
entire season, which would normally have begun in October, be
cancelled.! Stem's pressure was heaped upon the public's growing
resentment of a 191-day labor dispute between "short millionaires"
and "tall millionaires.,, 6 "You've got a bunch of pigs at the trough,"
commented Allen Sanderson, an economist and professor of sports
business at the University of Chicago, "and all they're trying to do
is nudge each other out of the way for the spoils."7 Thus, while
both parties had initially approached the bargaining sessions in
June "like two locomotives ... bearing down on each other [with]
alarm bells.., clanging,"8 by January, the negotiators for both
sides came to the table looking to compromise and reach an
agreement.
In the end, the players' union received an increase in minimum
salary and two mid-level salary provisions, improving the salaries
among both rookie and journeyman players. League officials pro-
4. See id.
5. See Glenn Dickey, Leverage Gave Owners a Large Victory, S. F. CHRON., Jan. 7,
1999, at E5.
6. Del Jones, Usually, Everybody Loses in Lockout, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 1999, at
3B.
7. Mark Asher, NBA Ready to Lock Out its Players, WASH. POST, June 30, 1998, at
B1.
8. Ken Fidlin, No Matter What Happens, the NBA Owners Have Won, TORONTO
SUN, January 6, 1999, at 82.
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jected an increase in the average player salary as a result of the
agreement, from $2.6 million in 1998 to $3.4 million in 1999.9 The
league, however, demanded and eventually received two stagger-
ing concessions. First, the NBA amended the existing team salary
cap to eliminate many of the loopholes that had allowed crafty
owners to sign desired players to long-term contracts of $100 mil-
lion or more.'0 The public saw these mega-contracts as excessively
extravagant, while NBA owners watched their competitors sign
players to contracts worth more than some entire franchises," and
recognized the paradoxical need for better (read: more expensive)
players for their own teams and, at the same time, self-restraint on
the part of other teams and the league as a whole.' 2 The second
concession won by the league was an unprecedented "individual"
salary cap, which acted as a further barrier to escalating salaries by
unconditionally limiting the amount any player may earn; the indi-
vidual salary cap was devised to curb owners from the temptation
of signing more players to large contracts, and evading the newly-
revised team salary cap.
The revised team salary cap obtained by the owners, referred to
as a "soft" cap, 3 restricted the amount of money a team could
spend on its roster, the total sum of salaries of the players on a
9. See id.
10. See 1999 NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, ARTICLE VII, SEC. 5. On
October 1, 1997, the Minnesota Timberwolves signed 21-year-old forward Kevin Gamett
to a record $125-million contract over six years, a deal worth $5 million more than the
asking price for the Timberwolves' baseball neighbors, the Twins. See Steve Aschbumer,
$125,000,000, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.) Oct. 2, 1997, at IA. In July, 1996, the
Los Angeles Lakers signed center Shaquille O'Neal for $120 million over seven years.
Other mega-contracts included Alonzo Mourning of the Miami Heat (7 years, $112 mil-
lion), and the Washington Wizards' Juwan Howard (7 years, $100.8 million). See id.
11. The $125 million deal between Minnesota and Garnett is worth $5 million more
than the asking price for the Timberwolves' baseball neighbors, the Twins. See
Aschburner, supra note 10, at IA.
12. See Bruce Balestier, Affectionate Distrust Marked Drafting of NBA Settlement,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1999, at 1 (reporting that the league's goal for the bargaining was "cost
certainty," but it achieved "a measure of cost predictability").
13. A "soft" cap is one in which teams can use "creative accounting" to shift players
(and their salaries) in order to create room under the salary limit to sign new players. This
is in contrast to a "hard" salary cap, to be discussed in Part II. See Paul Staudohar, Salary
Caps in Professional Team Sports, COMPENSATION AND WORKING CONDMONS, Spring
1998, at 3.
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team, to no more than $30 million in 1999 and $34 million in
2000. 4 Thus, if a team wanted to acquire a particular player, but
did not have enough money remaining under the salary cap to ac-
commodate the player's salary, the team would be precluded from
signing him. The new cap also limited the amount to which a team
could re-sign its own players, and the amount other teams could of-
fer to a player under free agency." A team's own players could re-
ceive no more than a 12% annual salary increase, while free agents
were only entitled to a 10% increase, an arrangement devised to
provide an additional disincentive for players intending to pursue
the open market of free agency. 6 The legality of the salary cap as a
restraint on players' mobility has been challenged and upheld in
court, 7 and the Supreme Court recently reinforced professional
sports leagues' authority to implement similar measures."
The second of the NBA's demands was an "individual" salary
cap, an unprecedented mechanism which limits the amount that
any team may pay any particular player, irrespective of the
player's worth in an unrestricted market, or, conversely, how much
money a team might otherwise be willing to offer that player.' 9 In
contrast to the "soft" team salary cap, this type of restriction is a
"hard" cap, as there are strictly no exceptions in which teams can
offer to pay a player more than the stipulated figure."' According to
the cap, players with up to five years of experience in the NBA can
14. See Phil Jasner, Last-Second Shot Produced NBA Peace, BUFF. NEws, Jan. 7,
1999, at IF.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987) (upholding legality of salary
cap); NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F.
Supp. 960 (D. N.J. 1987) (same). For a complete discussion of the Wood case, see infra
notes 98-114 and accompanying text. The legality of the salary cap has been questioned
by several law review articles. See Scott Foraker, Note, The National Basketball Asso-
ciation Salary Cap: An Antitrust Violation?, 59 S. CAL L. REv. 157 (1985); D. Albert
Daspin, Of Hoops, Labor Dupes and Antitrust Ally-Oops: Fouling Out the Salary Cap, 62
IND. L. J. 95 (1986).
18. See Brown v. National Football League, 518 U.S. 231 (1996); see also discus-
sion infra, notes 147-173 and accompanying text.
19. See Staudohar, supra note 13, at 3.
20. See id. No offer may be greater than the cap amount, although players are per-
mitted the precalculated annual raises which would technically increase the salary above
the cap amount. Id.
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earn no more than $9 million.2' Players who have been in the
league between six and nine years can receive up to $11 million,
while for players who have played for ten years or more, the
maximum salary increases to $14 million.2 Although a "grandfa-
ther" clause permits those players currently earning more than $14
million to keep their existing salaries, the NBA has apparently im-
plemented the type of salary restriction which the Supreme Court
found invalid per se in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soci-
ely.21 In Arizona, the Court held that maximum price-fixing agree-
ments, "no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the free-
dom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in
accordance with their own judgment., 24 In that case, the Supreme
Court declared that such "invidious" price-fixing schemes, even
where a maximum price is established, are illegal per se.25
This Note argues that both the team and individual salary caps
are unlawfully anticompetitive, according to the tenets of antitrust
law. This conclusion is reached through an examination of the le-
gality of the two salary cap provisions, the team and the individual
caps, particularly in light of antitrust law and any potential labor
exemptions. Part I reviews the history of labor and antitrust law
and the policies which they represent, as well as any potential ex-
emptions geared to protect labor-related activities. Part I also con-
trasts sports unions and traditional unions, suggesting that the for-
mer possess critical, if subtle, differences from the latter,
differences which require separate consideration of the two types
of unions. Part II analyzes the legality of both the NBA's team and
individual salary caps, and the anticompetitive effects of each type
of player restraint, under labor and antitrust law. In Part In, this
Note argues that the revenue-sharing "luxury tax" system used by
Major League Baseball, while not without its own problems, is a
much less restrictive means of harnessing players' salaries and
achieving the competitive parity which all these measures are de-
21. See Wise, supra note 2.
22. See id.
23. 457 U.S. 332 (1987).
24. Id. at 346 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223
(1940)).
25. See id.
2000]
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signed to accomplish. If the NBA's new, individual salary cap is
shielded from antitrust law, however, the provision will prove to be
unfairly and unnecessarily anticompetitive, and reduce the quality
of play in the NBA and the overall public enjoyment of the sport.
I. THE LABOR-ANTITRUST CONFLICT AND PLAYERS'
UNIONS:PROTECTING, AND DISTINGUISHING, ELECTRICIANS AND
ATHLETES
The salary cap articles of the NBA's collective bargaining
agreement are not necessarily as unlawfully anticompetitive as
they might first appear. To protect the collective bargaining activi-
ties of unions in their effort to advance their own interests, both
Congress and the Supreme Court have immunized unions from an-
titrust scrutiny under certain circumstances. It is not entirely clear,
however, when, or to whom, any exemption from antitrust law
should be applied. Such confusion is increased in cases involving
unionized athletes, or players' unions, since certain agreements are
"6essential" to professional sports leagues, such as arrangements for
league rules or roster sizes, while other agreements are not "essen-
tial," and must be subject to antitrust law. Additionally, there are
several important distinctions between unionized athletes and other
industrial unions, making it even more difficult to determine ex-
actly when to apply any antitrust exemption to collective bargain-
ing agreements.
A. The Labor-Antitrust Conflict
The collective bargaining of unions has been accorded certain
limited exemptions to antitrust law by both Congress and the judi-
ciary, for those instances in which otherwise anticompetitive prac-
tices should be deemed lawful. 26 While Section 1 of the Sherman
Act proclaims that "every contract, combination or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states.., is de-
clared to be illegal,"27 which in theory includes the "conspired"
acts of unions, "the most plausible understanding of the legislative
history of the Sherman Act is that it was not meant to apply to
26. See PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTrrRUST ANALYSIS 109-112 (1997).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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standard union activities. ,2 ' According to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act ("NLRA"), 9 unions must bargain collectively to deter-
mine "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment."30 Thus, they are statutorily entitled to reach decisions in
these matters that antitrust policy would normally reserve "for
market determination free of collective, industry-wide decisions."'"
In order to protect union activities from judicial review and in-
terference, Congress enacted the Clayton Act in 1914 and the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act in 1932.32 Sections 9 and 20 of the Clayton Act
state that unions are not illegal conspiracies, and further exempts
certain labor activities from antitrust law, "to equalize before the
law the position of workingman and employer as industrial com-
batants."33 Section 6 declares that:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor...
organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate ob-
jectives thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the mem-
bers thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations
or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under antitrust laws."
The Norris-LaGuardia Act further exempted unions from expo-
sure to antitrust law by removing from courts the authority to issue
injunctions in most labor disputes. 5 Judicial injunctions were now
the very last line of defense, available only after all reasonable
methods have been tried and found wanting.6
The Supreme Court has also devised a "non-statutory" labor
28. AREEDA, supra note 26, at 109.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
30. Id.
31. AREEDA, supra note 26, at 109.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1994).
34. Id.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
36. See Brotherhood of R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W..Railroad, 321 U.S. 50, 56-
57 (1944) (holding that the complainant must make "every reasonable effort to settle such
dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of
mediation or voluntary arbitration").
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exemption, which protects certain actions of employers (as op-
posed to unions, the designated beneficiaries of the "statutory" la-
bor exemption) from antitrust scrutiny. 7 Still, while most activities
involving unions or between unions and employers are exempt
from antitrust law, those restraints which are unreasonable, will not
be exempt.3" In Amalgamated Meat Cutters,39 for example, the Su-
preme Court held that contractually forcing employers to charge a
certain price for their products was illegal, even if it was achieved
through collective bargaining and intended to increase the wages
of union members. 40 Furthermore, no restriction whatsoever will be
permitted if it is found to be more than necessary to achieve the
union's legitimate objectives. 4' However, a recent Supreme Court
case firmly supported the contention that the objectives of collec-
tive bargaining supersede all but the most exceptional market con-
cerns.4 2 This holding strained the theory that certain reasonable
limits to economic competition are "essential to the effectiveness,
and sometimes to the existence of many wholly beneficial eco-
nomic activities. 43
While the NLRA and the concordant federal labor laws em-
body significant national industrial objectives, federal antitrust
policy and the Sherman Act complement the significance of those
37. Although both the language of the "statutory" or "non-statutory" exemptions, as
well as their respective meanings and applications, can be unclear, "all labor exemptions
are drawn from the labor and antitrust statutes and are therefore statutory; at the same
time, they are largely judge made, for the statutes are not very specific as to what is ex-
empt... [S]ome labor exemptions are more clearly inferred from statutory language than
are other labor exemptions." AREEDA, supra note 26, at n. 25.
38. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, 693 (1965) (holding
illegal measures which reveal "the elements of conspiracy in restraint of trade or an at-
tempt to monopolize").
39. Id.
40. See id. at 692. The NBA's collective bargaining agreement seems to provide an
opposite example of the Jewel Tea principle: instead of forcing employers to charge a
minimum price for a product, they are prohibited from paying more than a maximum
price for the "product."
41. See Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Loc. 100, 421 U.S.
616, 623 (1975) (finding that curtailment of competition based on efficiency is "neither a
goal of federal labor policy nor a necessary effect of the elimination of competition
among workers.").
42. See Brown v. National Football League, 518 U.S. 231, 245 (1996).
43. ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, 332 (1978).
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labor interests as "the Magna Carta of free enterprise."" Antitrust
policy and its underlying task of protecting consumers from anti-
competitive practices "are as important to the preservation of eco-
nomic freedoms and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of
Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal free-
doms.''5 Even after the enactment of federal labor policy, the Su-
preme Court has looked at the Sherman Act and the values imbued
therein as "a comprehensive charter of economic liberty," the most
reliable means of protecting "free and unfettered competition" in
order to preserve national "democratic, political and social institu-
tions."46 The Supreme Court has accordingly instructed that any
"exemptions from antitrust laws are to be strictly construed, ' 47
mandating thorough consideration of any possible exigencies in
which "Congress intended to override the fundamental national
policies embodied in the antitrust laws."" Thus, between the two
socioeconomic titans of labor, policy, which protects the rights of
unions and of workingmen, and antitrust policy, which protects the
rights of consumers in an unrestricted economy, must lie some
middle ground, a "proper accommodation between the congres-
sional policy favoring collective bargaining under the NLRA and
the congressional policy favoring free competition in business
markets., 49 Whether the NBA's current collective bargaining
agreement should be entitled to such accommodation remains to be
seen.
It is important to consider that, even where applicable, the an-
titrust exemptions were generally devised to shield unions from
antitrust liability and to promote legitimate employee interests. In
recent sports cases, however, that intent has been improperly in-
verted: the employer, rather than the union, seeks "derivative" an-
titrust immunity against claims made by the members of the union
itself: This matter is complicated even further by the exceptional
44. United States v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
45. Id.
46. Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
47. Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973).
48. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973).
49. Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Loc. 100, 421 U.S. 616,
622(1975).
50. See Brown v. National Football League, 518 U.S. 231, 255 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
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legal status of professional sports leagues, for while labor law fur-
nishes limited protection to certain concerted activities of business
competitors, the business between competing sports teams is in-
trinsically different from that between competitors in other indus-
tries. In professional sports leagues, for example, it would be:
unwise for all the teams to compete as hard as they can
against each other in a business way; the stronger teams
would be likely to drive the weaker ones into financial fail-
ure. If this should happen, not only would weaker teams
fail, but eventually the whole league, both the weak and the
stronger teams would fail, because without a league no
team can operate profitably."
In all professional sports leagues, a limited number of "essen-
tial" horizontal restraints on competition are indispensable. Pro-
fessional sports teams must make joint decisions in areas such as
league rules, schedules and rosters, to name a few, decisions
which, strictly speaking, would be prohibited by the Sherman Act
in other industries. "When a league of professional lacrosse teams
is formed," for example, "it would be pointless to declare their co-
operation illegal on the basis that there are no other professional
lacrosse teams." 3
Nevertheless, courts have also held that in certain regards,
sports leagues and their teams should in fact be construed as busi-
ness competitors.m Individual teams compete in the same manner
dissenting) ("[l]t would be most ironic to extend an exemption crafter to protect collec-
tive action by employees to protect employers acting jointly to deny employees the op-
portunity to negotiate their salaries individually in a competitive market."); Brown v. Pro
Football, 50 F.3d 1041, 1085 (Wald, J., dissenting) ("New incentives for employees not
to engage in collective bargaining-and the bizarre prospect of employers attempting to
force employees to remain in a union so as to preserve the employers' valuable antitrust
exemption-run directly contrary to the overarching purpose of the labor laws, to en-
courage bona fide collective bargaining."); Powell, 888 F.2d at 574 (Lay, C.J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) ("Union decertification is hardly a worthy goal to pur-
sue in balancing labor policy with the antitrust laws").
51. United States v. National Football League, 116 F.Supp. 319, 323 (D. Pa. 1953).
52. See National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (holding that professional sports is "an industry in which hori-
zontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all").
53. BORK, supra note 43, at 278.
54. See Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726
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as other industries over players, coaches and management person-
nel, as well as over ticket prices, radio and television revenues,
media space, and other income sources.5 For example, agreements
between teams to control players' salaries are not "essential" to
professional sports leagues the way agreements establishing
schedules, roster size or uniform rules and regulations of the game
are "essential." Therefore, agreements relating to conventional
business matters should be subject to antitrust law, while agree-
ments "essential" to professional sports should be entitled to ex-
emption. In this manner, sports leagues constitute "association[s]
of teams sufficiently independent and competitive with one another
to warrant [antitrust] scrutiny ... [as] separate business entities
whose products have an independent value." Because they com-
pete like other industries in business matters, sports leagues have
been and should continue to be treated like other industries in
matters where market restraints are generally not entitled to broad
antitrust exemption.
B. Professional Sports Unions v. Traditional Unions:
Discerning Power Forwards from Auto Workers
At this point, the subtle differences between sports unions and
traditional unions, those which antitrust exemption was initially
legislated to protect, become critical. Particularly relevant to the
issue of the NBA salary cap is the difference within professional
sports leagues between what employers (teams) pay and what em-
ployees (players) earn. On its face, the clarification seems merely
semantic, although for collective bargaining purposes (and, more
F.2d 1381, .1387-1390 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); North Am. Soccer
League v. Nat'l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1256-1258 (2d Cir 1982); McNeil v.
Nat'l Football League, 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P69,841, at 67,978-80 (D. Minn. 1992).
55. See Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1390 (Determining that
the disparity in profits between teams is due to "independent management policies re-
garding coaches, players, management personnel, ticket prices, concessions, luxury box
seats, as well as franchise location, all of which contribute to fan support and other in-
come sources. In addition to being independent business entities, [sports teams] do com-
pete with one another off the field as well as on to acquire players, coaches, and man-
agement personnel. In certain areas of the country where two teams operate in close
proximity, there is also competition for fan support, local television and local radio reve-
nues, and media space.").
56. Id. at 1389 (citations omitted).
20001
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L[J.
importantly, for the purposes of determining antitrust exemption),
an understanding of this distinction is crucial. In the professional
sports industry, like the entertainment industry, individual salaries
are not negotiated through collective bargaining efforts between a
union and an employer. Players' unions negotiate "terms and con-
ditions of employment"5 7 such as player drafts, minimum salaries,
pensions, and salary and grievance arbitration procedures. ' It is the
recognized practice within the professional sports industry, how-
ever, that negotiations over the salaries of individual players are
explicitly excluded from union administration. Rather, the delib-
eration and negotiation of individual players' salaries are left
strictly to the jurisdiction of each player and his agent, individu-
ally.59 This is largely due to the "extraordinary and unique skill and
ability" 6 required of professional athletes, and stands in contrast to
traditional labor unions, in which, despite "differing responsibili-
ties, skills and levels of efficiency, ' 61 the sheer number of skilled
members of traditional unions betrays this notion of "unique" or
"extraordinary" skill. This idiosyncrasy in professional sports both
57. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
58. In response to the argument that the NBA's collective bargaining agreement sets
minimum salaries and therefore should be permitted to set maximum salaries, see Mi-
chael S. Jacobs & Ralph Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Ath-
letes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L. J. 1 (1971). The Supreme Court has held
that where there is considerable variation in the circumstances of employment (like the
differences in skill levels and positions among professional basketball players), collective
bargaining agreements may in fact cover only minimum wages and certain conditions of
employment, and leave other areas to individual bargaining. See J. I. Case, Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1944).
59. See 1999 NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, ARTICLE XXXVI.
60. NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION UNIFORM PLAYER CONTRACT, PARAGRAPH
9: "The Player... agrees that he has extraordinary and unique skill and ability as a bas-
ketballplayer, [and] that the services to be rendered by him hereunder cannot be replaced
or the loss thereof adequately compensated for in money damages." Id. This type of char-
acterization is not unique to basketball, but is contained within the Uniform Player Con-
tracts for other sports as well. See Uniform Player Contract for Major League Baseball,
Section 4(a) ('The Player represents and agrees that he has exceptional and unique skill
and ability as a baseball player; that his services to be rendered hereunder are of a special,
unusual and extraordinary character which gives them peculiar value which cannot be
reasonably or adequately compensated for in damages at law, and that the Player's breach
of this contract will cause the Club great and irreparable injury and damage.").
61. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987).
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predates and was consented to by players' unions,62 and constitutes
an indispensable practice which any court must recognize to prop-
erly distinguish players' unions from other labor unions.
Professional sports leagues and players' unions agree upon the
unique talent required for professional athletics. Players' unions,
therefore, cannot effectively bargain over the wages of their mem-
bers (unlike traditional labor unions). Professional sports leagues
are closely related to, if not completely a part of, the entertainment
business. In entertainment, the same rules do not apply to one-of-
a-kind artists as with the typical wage earner.63 The salaries of pro-
fessional athletes generally do not vary upon their titles, responsi-
bilities, or years of service. Like celebrities, athletes are paid in
relation to the audience they attract and entertain. 64 Traditional un-
ion members are paid strictly according to the service they provide,
and on a much smaller scale. Electricians, for example, generate
service fees for their employers, but do not generate millions of
dollars in revenue from sell-out crowds or broadcasting fees so that
fans worldwide may watch them do their job. This is not to dispar-
age the services performed in traditional industries, but rather to
illustrate the difference in revenue generated for employers by em-
ployees and the relative worth of those employees to their employ-
ers. The salary structure within professional sports leagues is dis-
similar to the salary structure in traditional industries, because it is
intrinsically connected to the ability of its employees individually
to generate revenue. Measures taken by professional sports leagues
with respect to their players are therefore negotiated individually.
Consequently, the "wages" of professional athletes are not re-
solved collectively by players' unions such as NBPA. According to
the established practice of negotiating salaries individually, and the
underlying grounds for that practice, the NBPA should not have
jurisdiction to argue on behalf of (or in the case of the NBA's indi-
vidual salary cap, compromise) the salaries of individual players.
Other differences between the two types of unions are also
significant in terms of collective bargaining and reinforce the need
62. See LIONEL S. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAW, 303, 327 (1977).
63. See Paul Staudohar, Baseball's Changing Salary Structure, COMPENSATION AND
WORKING CONDITIONS, Fall 1997, at 4.
64. See id.
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for separate consideration of unionized athletes. For example, in
other industries, workers may pursue other employment and adapt
their skills to apply to related fields, thus providing surplus outlets
for their services. In professional sports, however, the "extraordi-
nary and unique skill and ability" 65 possessed by professional ath-
letes is rarely marketable in any other industry, reducing the num-
ber of employment opportunities to the select number of teams in a
league." This employment market is restricted even further by the
needs of a particular team, so that not all teams will require the
services of a particular type of player at a particular time. While
employees in other industries face similar concerns as well, the al-
ready-limited number of employment opportunities available to
professional athletes heighten the concern for such individuals.
6
The unique relationships between both individual players on a
team and between the players as a group and the team itself place
pressure on teams to find "a winning combination of attitude, tal-
ent and leadership."' This adds to a lack of job security, increased
even further by risk of injury or trade.69 Professional athletes pos-
sess extraordinary talent - inversely proportionate to the length of
their careers - and are entitled to concomitant salary considerations
from both the league and the players' union. Combined, these fac-
tors reinforce the theory that in the matter of "wages," the right of
unionized professional athletes to negotiate their salaries individu-
ally should not be infringed upon.
In sum, because of the extraordinary and unique talent pos-
sessed respectively by professional athletes, the salaries of such in-
dividuals cannot be bargained or decided upon collectively, in spite
of the objectives of federal labor policy. Furthermore, this position
is neither novel nor is it contested by professional sports leagues,
players' unions or athletes. Therefore, for a court to hold that a
professional sports league may find a player's worth to be so ex-
ceptional that it must be determined individually and without the
65. SOBEL, supra note 62, at 17.
66. See Ethan Lock, The Scope of Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989
DuKE L.J. 339, 403 (1989).
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See id.
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involvement of the union, but that the league may reach an agree-
ment with the players' union that no player's salary can exceed a
predetermined amount of money, is untenable. The right of profes-
sional athletes to negotiate their salaries individually must be re-
spected, and any restrictions or intrusions upon that authority must
be condemned.
II. THE NBA's CURRENT AGREEMENT: THE TEAM AND INDIVIDUAL
SALARY CAPS
The NBA's "soft" team salary cap has received greater legal
analysis than the individual salary cap, but only because it is an
older, "veteran" restraint. Its legality has been upheld in several
cases, most arguing that the importance of collective bargaining
outweighs any minor constraint on professional athletes' employ-
ment opportunities. This rationale is similar to the Rule of Reason
antitrust analysis, in which employers may avoid antitrust liability
by imposing only restraints that can be justified as procompetitive.
The "hard" individual cap, on the other hand, has yet to be chal-
lenged in any court, but may ultimately prove to be much more de-
structive to players' rights to employment and to a competitive
market as a whole. Because of the clear price-fixing element in-
volved, the individual salary cap is not deserving of antitrust im-
munity under any labor-related exemption, and should be subject
to per se analysis under antitrust law. Any assertions that applying
antitrust law to such market restraints will endanger professional
sports leagues are untenable except to the extent that those busi-
nesses are themselves anticompetitive. °
A. The Team Salary Cap: "Protecting Owners From
Themselves," In Perpetuity"
72The team salary cap, the "quid pro quo" to free agency, was
introduced to the professional sports world during the 1984-85
NBA season. In 1981, the NBA was struggling: sixteen of its
70. See Note, Releasing Superstars From Peonage: Union Consent and the Non.
statutory Labor Exemption, 104 HARV. L. REv. 874, 885 n.81 (1991).
71, Brenton Welling & Jonathan Tasini, Basketball: Business is Booming, BUS.
WK., Oct. 28, 1985, at 78.
72. See Staudohar, supra note 13, at 3.
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twenty-three teams lost money, and four had been put up for sale."
Many teams, particularly those located in small markets, could not
attract talented players because they did not generate the same
revenue as big-market teams, and were therefore unable to extend
comparable offers to talented players. Without talented players,
such teams became "perpetual losers," and could not attract fans.
Without fans providing a steady source of revenue, small-market
teams were on the verge of bankruptcy. At the peril of financial
instability, the NBA argued with the NBPA that the only way for
the league to escape "economic Darwinism' '" 5 and to stay in busi-
ness was to set a maximum amount that each team could spend on
players' salaries. In exchange, the league offered to share a per-
centage of revenues in order to guarantee a minimum amount that
each team would spend on salaries. Under the proposal, players
would receive 53% of the defined gross-revenue - gate receipts,
local and national media contracts, and other sources of income -
and the owners would receive a "salary cap" on team payroll of
$3.6 million per club.76
Since its inception in 1954, the NBPA had made significant
strides in its representation of players, including the elimination of
the reserve clause, the establishment of a pension, increases in
health benefits, the minimum salary, and per diem allowances."
The union understood, however, that large losses suffered by the
league and its teams would inevitably result in large losses suffered
by players. If it agreed to the salary cap, the respective successes
and failures of each party would be linked like never before. Faced
with the alternative of a potentially sinking ship, the players acqui-
esced, and an agreement was reached in March, 1983, to imple-
ment the salary cap beginning with the 1984-85 season.
The salary cap was intended to make the game of professional
basketball more competitive, and hence more attractive to fans.
73. See Welling, supra note 71, at 78.
74. See Jacobs, supra note 58, at 18.
75. David M. Carter, The Crack of the Bat - and Labor Strife in the Air, Bus. WK.,
April 19, 1999, at 120.
. 76. See Scott Howard-Cooper, A 10-Year-Old System That Revolutionized Sports,
L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 21, 1994, at C9.
77. See NBPA TIMELI , provided by NBPA (on file with author).
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The NBA, not unlike other professional sports leagues, feared that
without restrictions on player mobility, the richer teams in major
media markets would outbid their poorer rivals for the best players
and dominate the league, ruining competitive balance and reducing
fan interest.7' The team salary cap limited the payrolls of all teams,
irrespective of revenue, to the same modest amount, thereby plac-
ing an artificial control on team payrolls and fostering an anticom-
petitive practice among teams in order to improve the level of
competition between them. The initial cap was $3.6 million in
1983, and although that figure had exploded to $34 million in
1999, the salary cap has regularly made jugglers out of general
managers, forcing them to find ways to "create room" under the
cap for desired players and preventing them from pursuing other-
wise-desirable players whose salaries cannot be accommodated.79
Nevertheless, the salary cap has been widely championed as "the
league's stabilizing force," largely responsible for the NBA's "re-
turn from the abyss."8" NBA Commissioner David Stem has gone
so far as to say that the adoption of the salary cap will go down in
history as "the turning point of the NBA."8' Thus, the recent domi-
nance of the Chicago Bulls notwithstanding, smali-market teams
like those located in Portland, Oregon and Salt Lake City, Utah,
have been able to remain competitive. This plan culminated most
recently in the San Antonio Spurs' victory over the New York
Knicks in the 1999 NBA Finals. 2
Some critics - individual players and the NBPA, to be sure -
have argued that in an atmosphere of unimagined, unbridled suc-
cess such as currently exists in the NBA, the salary cap is unneces-
sary and that it should have ended with the league's financial turn-
78. See Smith v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
79. See Joseph Juliano, NBA Salary Cap Rule Keeps GMs Hustling, L.A. TIMEs,
Oct. 13, 1984, at DI.
80. Welling, supra note 71, at 78.
81. Anthony Cotton, With NBA Ratings, Revenues Up, Commissioner Sees Resur-
gence, WASH. PosT, June 23, 1985, at D1.
82. In the 1990s, small-market teams like the Portland Trail Blazers, Utah Jazz, Or-
lando Magic, Seattle Supersonics, and the Spurs all reached the NBA Finals, while many
other small-market teams have reached the playoffs. See
<www.nba.com/history/awards-finalschampsmvp.html>
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around which it was originally intended to induce. 3 Still other
critics argue that the salary cap is not the rainmaker its proponents
claim it to be. Admittedly, Stem acknowledged that "[w]hether
it's working depends on who you're asking." 5 Nevertheless, in its
defense, Stem has argued that the salary cap is still a necessity: in
spite of the NBA's good fortune, newfound success has created
newfound problems, and the salary cap is now needed, perpetually,
to "protect owners from themselves.""
The anticompetitive nature of the team salary cap was put di-
rectly into question in Wood v. NBA,87 although other courts have
deliberated similar player restraints with differing results. In
Wood, the Second Circuit held that while the salary cap was injuri-
ous to players, the benefits of the collective bargaining agreement
in which it was contained furthered federal labor policy, and
thereby established an inference of legitimacy for the provision as
well.8 9 However, the Wood decision has been criticized for not
properly considering the anticompetitive implications of the salary
cap in violation of antitrust law, and for not giving sufficient
weight to the singular characteristics of sports leagues and unions
83. See Howard-Cooper, supra note 76, at C9.
84. A salary cap may not ensure competitive balance between teams, since owners
individually do not want competitive balance, they want to win:
Certain general managers and executives are paid six- and sometimes seven-
figure salaries because they do a superior job of sizing up players and building
a cohesive team. Coaches and managers vary in their ability to get the most out
of a roster of players, and their inputs can be critical to a team's success. A sal-
ary cap applies only to expenditures on players, so it is expected that strong
drawing teams, with more revenue potential than other teams, will be in a better
position to hire top general managers and coaches or managers.
Joseph P. Fuhr, Jr., Stee-rike Four! What's Wrong With the Business of Baseball?, ATL.
ECON. J., June 1, 1999, at 221 (reviewing DANIEL R. MARBURGER, STEE-RIKE FOUR!
WHAT'S WRONG WrrH THE BusINEss OF BASEBALL? (1997)).
85. Ian Brenner, Stern Visualizes No Problems for NBA, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov.
10, 1985, at 8
86. Welling, supra note 71, at 78.
87. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987).
88. Compare National Basketball Association v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir.
1995) (upholding player restraints); Bridgeman v. National Basketball Association, 924
F. Supp. 103 (D.N.J. 1993) (same); Robertson v. National Basketball Association, 389 F.
Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding player restraints illegal); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro
Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (same).
89. See Wood, 809 F.2d at 958-59.
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as compared to more traditional unions." In Mackey v. National
Football League,9' the Eighth Circuit devised a three-prong test for
granting professional sports leagues antitrust exemption to ensure
that lawful collective bargaining agreements do not effectuate un-
reasonable market restraints.92 This test was crudely applied in
Brown v. National Football League, in which the Supreme Court
held that, in terms of labor relations, professional sports leagues
are, for the most part, completely exempt from antitrust liability.93
Yet while the Supreme Court applied elements of the Mackey test
from that decision, it disregarded any meaningful distinction be-
tween players' unions and traditional unions, similar to the Wood
holding. 94 It is likely that Brown will blaze a trail for anticompeti-
tive, misguided, league-sponsored market restraints such as the
salary cap, all under the guise of lawful collective bargaining.
1. Wood v. National Basketball Association
In Wood v. NBA,95 Leon Wood, an accomplished college bas-
ketball player and member of the gold medal-winning 1984 U.S.
Olympic basketball team, challenged under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act certain provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement between the NBA and the NBPA."' Among other arti-
cles of the agreement, Wood contested the legality of the salary
cap, which limited him to an offer of $75,000 from the Philadel-
phia 76ers. The team was over the salary cap at the time it drafted
Wood, and thus could offer him no more than the minimum sal-
ary.97 The Second Circuit found that the provision in question was
not "the product solely of an agreement among horizontal com-
petitors but [was] embodied in a collective bargaining agreement
between the employer or employers and a labor organization
reached through procedures mandated by a federal labor legisla-
90. See Daspin, supra note 17, at 103.
91. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
92. For further discussion of Mackey, see infra notes 111-137 and accompanying
text.
93. See Brown v. National Football League, 518 U.S. 231, 249 (1996).
94. Id.
95. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
96. Id. at 954.
97. Id. at 955.
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tion." 98 The court emphasized the virtues of collective bargaining,
commenting that "no one seriously contends that the antitrust laws
may be used to subvert fundamental principles of our federal labor
policy." 99 While the court admitted that Wood was in fact injured
by the NBA's collective bargaining agreement, it declined to de-
termine whether the salary cap is a per se violation of antitrust law
or subject to the Rule of Reason, a more tolerant standard of anti-
trust analysis.i"
Writing for the court in Wood, Judge Ralph Winter held that as
a matter of policy, any judicial interference in labor negotiations
and collective bargaining whatsoever would "unravel" the very
agreements courts were obligated to protect. However, the con-
gressional enactment of both the Fair Labor Standards Act,'0 ' for
example, as well as the Occupational Safety and Health Act,"0 2
each of which imposes contract terms which would ordinarily be
left to be negotiated between the parties under a strict interpreta-
tion of labor policy, apparently contradict Judge Winter's asser-
tion.' O3 These federally-mandated "terms and conditions of em-
ployment" cannot be disregarded even upon agreement of both
parties involved, as Congress felt that certain national economic
interests did indeed prevail over federal labor policy. In line with
these statutes, the Supreme Court has similarly refused to grant
blanket antitrust exemptions in the name of labor policy.,
In response to Wood's argument that his athletic ability entitled
him to bargain individually for a higher salary, Judge Winter noted
that "collective agreements routinely set standard wages for em-
ployees with differing responsibilities, skills and levels of effi-
ciency."'0'5 What Judge Winter failed to recognize, however, is the
precedent, in professional sports, that individual players' skills do
98. Id. at 954.
99. Id. at 958.
100. Id. at 962. For further discussion of the per se and Rule of Reason analyses of
antitrust law, see infra notes 168-213 and accompanying text.
101. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1994) (minimum wages and maximum hours).
102. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994) (working conditions).
103. See SOBEL, supra note 62, at 327.
104. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, 684 n.3 (1965),
accord United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
105. Wood, 809 F.2d at 959.
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not occupy different "levels of efficiency, '"'0 but rather are recog-
nized by league and union alike as "extraordinary and unique. ' '
Consequently, their salaries are based entirely on individual "re-
sponsibilities [and] skills,"' 8 and are never negotiated collectively.
Indeed, standard collective bargaining agreements in professional
sports contain clauses explicitly excluding player salaries from ne-
gotiations.' °9 This does not mean that players' unions should be en-
titled to preferential treatment, but rather an understanding that the
"terms and conditions of employment" on a basketball court differ
significantly from those on an assembly line. This is a fundamental
distinction whose application undermines the purpose of the fed-
eral labor policy to protect employees. In the words of Justice
Stevens, "[it would be most ironic to extend an exemption crafted
to protect employees to protect employers acting jointly to deny
employees the opportunity to negotiate their salaries in a competi-
tive market. ' .. The Wood court's failure to address this difference
critically impairs its analysis of the salary cap under labor and an-
titrust law.
2. Mackey v. National Football League
In Mackey v. National Football League,"' the Eighth Circuit
examined a litany of Supreme Court cases deliberating the proper
circumstances under which a court may grant antitrust exemption
to the activities of an employer such as a professional sports
league. 112 In Mackey, several professional football players chal-
lenged "the Rozelle Rule," a provision of their collective bargain-
ing agreement which required that a team compensate an acquired
player's former team through cash, other players or draft selections
for its loss."3 The result of this rule was that teams were increas-
106. Id.
107. See SOBEL, supra note 62, at 17.
108. Wood, 809 F.2d at 959.
109. See Robert Garbarino, So You Want to Be a Sports Lawyer, I VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L. F. 11 at 36 (1994).
110. Brown v. National Football League, 518 U.S. 231, 255 (1996) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
111. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1976).
112. Id. at610.
113. Id.
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ingly reluctant to compete for the services of a player from another
team, thus greatly reducing the number of offers made to free
agents." 4 The court balanced the competing objectives of labor and
antitrust law and held that if the collective bargaining agreement
was undertaken by the union in "furtherance of its own interests,"
the statutory labor exemption will generally apply."' Even in cir-
cumstances in which an exemption might apply, however, unions
may not use the antitrust exemption to assist employers in violating
the Sherman Act. 1 6 Where an agreement both encourages collec-
tive bargaining and advances union objectives, market interference
will be tolerated and exemption from antitrust law will be granted,
along with the concurrent "preeminence over federal antitrust pol-
icy" of protecting competitive markets."7
The Mackey court ultimately streamlined these labor and anti-
trust interests into a three-prong test specifically designed for
dealing with facts particular to professional sports cases. The first
element of the test is that the market restraint may only "primarily"
affect parties to the collective bargaining relationship."' This ar-
gument was gleaned from an earlier Supreme Court case in which
an agreement barred non-union subcontractors from competing for
work from an employer." 9 Second, the agreement sought to be ex-
empted must pertain to mandatory subjects of collective bargain-
ing. '2 Finally, the agreement must be the result of "bona fide arm's
length bargaining" between the parties.' If all three elements of
the Mackey test are satisfied, then the collective bargaining agree-
ment will be entitled to labor exemption.
The first element of the Mackey test, that the agreement can
114. Id.
115. Id. at 611 (quoting United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 224 (1941)).
116. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945) (Finding
that "[i]f business groups, by combining with labor unions, can fix up prices and divide
up markets, it was little more than a futile gesture for Congress to prohibit price-fixing by
business groups themselves").
117. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, 689-697 (1965).
118. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 617.
119. Id. (quoting Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Loc. 100,
421 U.S. 616, 625-26 (1975)).
120. Id. at 619.
121. Id. at624.
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only have a primary effect on parties to the agreement, is most
likely satisfied by the NBA's team salary cap provision. Although
union members might argue that the team salary cap reduces the
opportunities for teams to accommodate players' individual salary
demands, the team salary cap only relates directly to a team's total
payroll, and does not affect any player's earning potential indi-
vidually. That the team salary cap is a flexible, soft cap, and may
thus be arranged to accommodate a particular player's salary de-
mands, supports this argument. Alternatively, team owners might
contend that the salary cap artificially limits their ability to acquire
the services of talented, if high-priced, players whose skills would
make their clubs more competitive and more profitable. The NBA,
however, is authorized to bargain on behalf of all member teams,
and is not prevented from limiting the spending of those teams in
order to further their collective interests. Therefore, it is likely that
the team salary cap has a primary effect only on parties to the col-
lective bargaining agreement.
The team salary cap will likely be seen to deal with mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining, thereby meeting the second
prong of the Mackey test as well. 2 The National Labor Relations
Act imposes a good-faith duty on the party of both employers and
unions to negotiate mandatory subjects of collective bargaining,
which include "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment."' 23 Because the team salary cap deals directly with
how much a team may pay its roster in the form of a ceiling on
payroll, this would likely constitute "wages."114 Admittedly, the
Mackey test has been criticized for endowing this criterion with far
too much significance, regardless of whether or not the team salary
cap falls within its definition. 2 5 In Robertson v. NBA, 26 a court in
the Southern District of New York held that "'mandatory subjects
of collective bargaining' do not carry talismanic immunity from
the antitrust laws" and went so far as to say that they are largely
122. See id.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
124. This is in contrast to the individual salary cap, which more directly limits how
much a particular player may earn, as opposed to how much a particular team may pay its
players as a whole.
125. See Daspin, supra note 17, at 111-113.
126. Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
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"irrelevant" to the legality of a collective bargaining agreement. 127
This sentiment echoed the opinion of Justice Goldberg in Jewel
Tea, who stated that "[t]he direct and overriding interest of unions
in such subjects as wages, hours and other working conditions
which Congress has recognized in making those subjects of man-
datory bargaining, is clearly lacking where the subject of the
agreement is price-fixing and market allocation."' 2 "Moreover,"
Justice Goldberg continued, "such activities are at the core of the
type of anticompetitive commercial restraint at which the antitrust
laws are directed.' ' 129 Regardless of whether an agreement concerns
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, any artificial distribu-
tion of market allocation is strictly prohibited, even where the in-
tent of the agreement is to establish a balanced allocation of re-
sources, as was the objective of the team salary cap. 3" Thus, it is
disputed whether "mandatory subjects of collective bargaining"' 31
is as pertinent as the Mackey test seems to imply.
The third element of the Mackey test requires that the agree-
ment must be reached through "bona fide arm's length collective
bargaining" between the parties. 3 2 This criterion is also presuma-
bly satisfied by the agreement between the NBA and the NBPA, as
evidenced by the conflict's rancorous six-month history.'33
In the end, however, the Mackey test throws a toss-up as to
whether the team salary cap is lawful, particularly in light of the
circumstances in which the NBA's collective bargaining agree-
ment was negotiated. The team salary cap most likely affects only
parties to the agreement, and was conducted at the requisite "bona
fide arm's length." On the other hand, whether the agreement
properly deals with "wages" as part of collective bargaining, and
whether the NBPA has authority to bargain in such matters, may
127. Id. at 888.
128. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, 732-33 (1965) (Gold-
berg, J. dissenting in part, concurring in part).
129. Id.
130. See Daspin, supra note 17, at 103.
131. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
132. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 617.
133. It could even be said that the relationship between the NBA and the NBPA
was, at times, at much farther than arm's length. For further details of the NBA lockout,
see Zack Burgess, NBA Beats the Buzzer, KANSAS Crry STAR, Jan. 7, 1999, at D1.
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be disputed. In Brown v. National Football League,'34 the most re-
cent review of the conflux of labor and antitrust law as it relates to
professional sports, the Supreme Court indirectly employed the
Mackey test to reach a Wood-like conclusion.'35 It maintained the
steadfast supremacy of labor law over antitrust law, and dispensed
a largely indiscriminate antitrust exemption to collective bargain-
ing. 36 Legal critics have speculated that the Court's "end-run"
around antitrust policy in Brown will immunize team owners in all
professional sports from essentially all antitrust scrutiny, increas-
ing "the potential to spread baseball's bitter and debilitating
player-owner relations to their sports."'37 The Supreme Court's
holding thus threatens to exclude all professional athletes from the
protection of the law, depriving members of players' unions of any
legitimate course of action against the anticompetitive practices of
their employers.
3. Brown v. National Football League
During the course of labor negotiations in 1989, the National
Football League ("NFL") proposed a "developmental" practice
squad, comprised of players who had not made the team roster but
would be available in case of injury to roster players. 3 s These
players would each receive a flat, weekly salary of $1,000. The
football players' union rejected the league's proposal, arguing that
the new, non-roster players should be able to negotiate their own
salaries like roster players.'39 After the negotiations reached an im-
passe, the league unilaterally implemented its plan, which included
the initiation of the "developmental" squad. This action was chal-
lenged by members of the practice squads as a violation of the
Sherman Act as a restraint of trade which prevented them from ne-
gotiating their individual market worth.' In rejecting the players'
argument, the Supreme Court held that "to permit antitrust liability
134. Brown v. National Football League, 518 U.S. 231 (1996)
135. Id. at 250.
136. Id. at 253.
137. Harvey Berkman, Baseball Labor Woes May Move Onto the Gridiron, NAT'L
L. J., April 8, 1996, at BI.
138. Brown, 518 U.S. at 242.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 243.
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here threatens to introduce instability and uncertainty into the col-
lective bargaining process, for antitrust law often forbids or dis-
courages the kinds of joint discussions and behavior that the col-
lective bargaining process invites or requires."' 4' The Court
reflected the same contention as Judge Winter proposed in Wood,
that no one could reasonably question the primacy of labor inter-
ests over antitrust law.44 By following the reasoning in Wood,
however, the Supreme Court lay itself open to the same criticism:
complete oversight of the differences between players' unions and
other traditional unions, with particular inattention to the industry
practice in professional sports of negotiating salaries individually,
resulting in a disquieting, all-inclusive judgment.
The Supreme Court developed its argument in favor of the
nonstatutory antitrust exemption at length.4 3 Only in its conclusion
did the Court hastily insert an indirect reference to the Mackey test:
For these reasons, we hold that the implicit ("nonstatu-
tory") antitrust exemption applies to the employer conduct
at issue here. That conduct took place during and immedi-
ately after a collective-bargaining negotiation. It grew out
of, and was directly related to, the lawful operation of the
bargaining process. It involved a matter that the parties
were required to negotiate collectively. And it concerned
only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship.'"
Returning to its motivation to bolster federal labor policy, the
Court asserted that, as part of its origins, one of the objectives of
the National Labor Relations Board "was to take from antitrust
courts the authority to determine, through application of the anti-
trust laws, what is socially or economically desirable collective-
bargaining policy."' 4  The theory which the Brown decision im-
puted to the NLRB, however, and the subsequent policy which the
Court itself independently enacted, is that labor law and antitrust
law can never subsist in congruity with each other. If the policy of
141. Id. at 242.
142. Wood, 809 F.2d at 958.
143. Brown, 518 U.S. at 242.
144. Id. at 250.
145. Id. at 242.
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collective bargaining is to be protected at all, the Supreme Court
seems to say, then all activities conducted therein must be pro-
tected, regardless of undue market restraint. The Supreme Court
tempered its holding and admitted that it did not condone "every
joint imposition of terms by employers,"' but that the facts of
Brown did not call for a definition of such "extreme outer bounda-
ries.'
147
As a matter of policy, however, employers should not be enti-
tled to antitrust exemption in the name of labor policy where their
conduct restrains the interests of employees in violation of federal
labor policy legislated to advance those interests. 48 The nonstatu-
tory exemption is rooted not in the interests of employers to stabi-
lize costs, but in "the association of employees to eliminate com-
petition over wages and working condition."' 49 In contrast,
however, there is "no similarly strong labor policy that favors the
association of employers to eliminate a competitive method of ne-
gotiating wages that predates collective bargaining and that labor
would prefer to preserve."'" With the unprecedented scope of em-
ployers' antitrust exemption in Brown, the only alternative left to
players to challenge an existing restraint of trade is to decertify
their union, resulting in "the bizarre prospect of employers at-
tempting to force employees to remain in a union so as to preserve
the employers' valuable antitrust exemption."''M Therefore, con-
trary to the Supreme Court's reasoning, federal labor policy is ac-
tually compromised, not promoted, when antitrust exemption is
extended in cases in which "protecting the objectives of collective
bargaining" leaves union members with decertification of their
union as the only method of furthering their collective interests. 
2
146. Id. at 250.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 255 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]t would be most ironic to extend an
exemption crafter to protect collective action by employees to protect employers acting
jointly to deny employees the opportunity to negotiate their salaries individually in a
competitive market.").
149. Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Loc. 100, 421 U.S. 616,
622 (1975).
150. Brown, 518 U.S. at 257 (Stevens, J., dissenting). /
151. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J.,
dissenting).
152. See Paul Staudohar, The Scope of Pro Football's Antitrust Exemption, LAB. L.
2000]
FORDHAM INTELL PROP., MEDIA & ENT. LJ.
The facts surrounding the NBA team salary cap may be distin-
guished further from Brown in several key respects. First, the
plaintiffs in Brown were relatively inconsequential "bit" players,
members of an "experimental" practice squad who challenged the
mechanical salary structure of a proposed training system (one
which provided them with their only opportunity to play profes-
sional football). The Supreme Court could not look to any "indus-
try practice" relating to the salaries of such players: otherwise-
unqualified non-roster members specifically employed exclusively
to practice with members of a team's roster. The NFL offered them
a pat figure, which had to be accepted if the players wanted to play
football at all. Similarly, the effect of the league's "market re-
straint," the predetermined salary instituted by the NFL for these
players, would be negligible at most. The players were not suffi-
ciently skilled to play for NFL teams, and thus held no collective
bargaining power. To evaluate and negotiate the individual value
of relatively unskilled players might arguably cost more than the
introduction of the practice squad system as a whole would be
worth.
The salaries of NBA players, on the other hand, with their
"extraordinary" talent, have always been negotiated individually, a
right explicitly granted to NBA players in their contracts. 5 3 In
contrast to NBA players, "the developmental squad contracts [in
Brown] indicate that the prospective developmental squad players
had no right to negotiate their own salary terms but instead were to
receive a fixed non-negotiable salary of $1,000 per week."'' 4 The
majority opinion in Brown conceded that athletes "often have spe-
cial, individualized talents, and, unlike many unionized workers,
they often negotiate their pay individually with their employers."' I5
However, the Supreme Court missed the target: individual athletes
don't "often" negotiate their salaries, they always do, and the im7
position of the salary cap limits that ability of highly-skilled,
highly-marketable players to negotiate offers individually from
NBA teams. This difference, however, is seen by the Court as
J., March 1999, at 41.
153. See 1999 NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, ARTICLE XXXVI.
154. Brown, 518 U.S. at 256, n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 249.
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"simply a feature, like so many others" relevant to the collective
bargaining process, and is casually dismissed.
5 6
Additionally, the impact of the salary cap as a market restraint
upon NBA players is much more significant than that of the devel-
opmental squad salary upon the practice players in Brown.
Whereas the players in Brown had no other opportunities to play
professional football and were presented with a "take-it-or-leave-
it" offer, the sports sections of newspapers are filled with accounts
of general managers trying to engineer deals to accommodate the
salaries of talented players under their teams' caps.5 7 Some play-
ers are fortunate and are signed, and some - those whose salaries
cannot be accommodated - are not. Those who are not signed are
denied their market worth in the form of salaries from teams that
would be interested in acquiring their services, teams which would
gladly confer tens of millions of dollars but are prevented from
doing so by the team salary cap. The salary cap, once again, is an
effort "to protect the owners from themselves."'58 It is also a po-
tentially anticompetitive market restraint, and yet because it was
contrived during the course of collective bargaining, it would most
likely be characterized by the Supreme Court as similar to the
practice challenged in Brown, sufficiently so to warrant the same
antitrust exemption as was extended in that case.
While collective bargaining does deserve protection from anti-
trust law if it is to achieve its purpose, such entitlement cannot
provide employers such as professional sports leagues with a carte
blanche privilege to implement anticompetitive practices in viola-
tion of antitrust law. Within the context of collective bargaining,
employers must be assured that concerted activity; where reason-
able, will be protected under labor law; alternatively, employers
must be warned that concerted activity, where unreasonable, will
be disciplined under antitrust law. This type of 'Judicial interfer-
ence" is necessary to ensure not just the protection of employees as
mandated by the NLRA, 59 but also the maintenance of a free and
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Jerry Greene, Movers & Shakers; Is It Rebuilding or Reloading?
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 29, 1999, at G4.
158. Welling, supra note 71, at 78.
159. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
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open economy, as guaranteed under the Sherman Act.'0 Any dis-
ruption or "unraveling" of collective bargaining agreements would
only be as a result of the appropriate and necessary protection of
the objectives of both federal labor and antitrust policy.
Whether the NBA's team salary cap constitutes an "essential"
horizontal restraint necessary to the sports industry, 6" or an unrea-
sonable restraint in violation of antitrust law, must be decided un-
der this analysis. In cases involving both labor and antitrust law,
"the crucial determinant is not the form of the agreement - e.g.,
prices or wages - but its relative impact on the product market and
the interests of union members."' 62 Here, the relative impact of the
team salary cap is the artificial diminution of opportunities avail-
able to NBA players, which does nothing to promote the interests
of those union members. In spite of antitrust law, the Wood and
Brown decisions have established a dangerous line of precedent by
turning the table on players' unions, lauding the union-oriented
objectives of federal labor policy while pulling from the reach of
unionized athletes their only reasonable course of action. No court
has yet been able to sink a game-winning shot and fulfill the con-
flicting yet equally-important objectives of labor and antitrust pol-
icy.
B. The Individual Salary Cap: "It's not ordinarily the way one
does business in this country.",
63
A unique form of logic was employed by the NBA during the
recent collective bargaining negotiations, manifesting itself in the
birth of the individual salary cap. While representatives of the
NBA referred to the individual salary cap as "a measure of cost
certainty" i6 for the team owners, the unprecedented restraint is
actually an unabashedly artificial limit on the earning potential of
NBA players in response to the extravagant business habits of their
employers. As a result of frantic bidding wars resulting in skyrock-
160. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
161. See BORK, supra note 43, at 278.
162. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, 690 n.5 (1965).
163. Gary Pomerantz, Baseball Owners Want NBA-Type Salary Cap, WASH. POST,
May 21, 1985, at D1.
164. Fatsis, supra note 3, at A3.
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eting player salaries, the NBA has unconditionally prohibited any
team from spending more than a predetermined figure on any indi-
vidual player. In short, the players are doing penance for the own-
ers' sins. In an open market players could earn significantly more
than the prescribed figures. This imposition of the individual salary
cap constitutes price-fixing, a prohibited market restraint in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court has devised two standards to analyze the
reasonableness of market restraints. The Rule of Reason balances
the market restraint against its business purpose to determine
whether or not the procompetitive benefits of the practice to the
industry outweigh its anticompetitive effects. This argument relies
upon similar considerations to the nonstatutory labor exemption
(although applied generally), that in certain industries and busi-
nesses some restrictive practices are ultimately beneficial and de-
serving of legal protection instead of penalty. The second rule, the
per se rule, is targeted specifically for instances of price-fixing, 6
and is therefore a more appropriate gauge by which to measure the
NBA's individual salary cap. This rule is applied where the court
finds unambiguous tampering with prices or wages and may con-
sequently adjudicate the case without needlessly considering any
attempt at justification.'6 Admittedly, market restraints in profes-
sional sports cases are usually analyzed under the Rule of Reason
because of the industry's need for certain limited restrictions in or-
der to operate. 6 However, because of the inflexibility of the hard
individual salary cap, its direct impact on players' salaries and its
disproportionately anticompetitive consequences, it is possible that
the market restraint at hand could prove to be an exception even in
the sports industry, and demand scrutiny under the per se rule.
165. See Northern P. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
166. See id.
167. See NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (holding unrea-
sonable NCAA's television restrictions on number of intercollegiate football games
school may televise); Regents of Univ. of Calif. V. ABC Inc., 747 F.2d 511 (9th
Cir.1984)(holding unreasonable similar College Football Association television restric-
tion).
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1. The Rule of Reason
Under the Rule of Reason, market restraints are more widely
recognized than under the per se rule. Indeed, technically, all con-
tracts, agreements, regulations and laws concerning trade consti-
tute market restraints in violation of the Sherman Act. 68 In re-
sponse to this theory, the Supreme Court devised a test for dealing
with those instances where the injury from the restraint does not
clearly outweigh its benefits. In the landmark case of Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States,69 Justice Brandeis provided a
definition of the Rule of Reason:
The true test of legality is whether the restrain imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question the court
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business
to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the re-
straint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained,
are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention
will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the re-
verse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court
to interpret facts and predict consequences."
In that case, the Supreme Court upheld a particular regulation
of the Chicago grain market which restricted the times in which
bids could be made. 7' The Court reasoned that the rule in question
had "no appreciable effect on general market prices,"'72 and the
rule itself concerned "the period of price-making,' 7' not price-
making itself. This standard was narrowed in National Society of
168. See AREEDA, supra note 26, at 109.
169. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
170. Id. at 238.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 239.
173. Id. at240.
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Professional Engineers v. United States, 14 in which the Court held
that the Rule of Reason, "[c]ontrary to its name,. .. does not open
the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a chal-
lenged restraint that may fall within the realm of reason. Instead, it
focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact on competi-
tive conditions."'75 In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that a
group of professionals which voluntarily prohibited competitive
bidding was not justified under the Rule of Reason, in spite of its
claim that the prohibition prevented inferior work products and en-
sured ethical behavior within the industry.7 6 The Court held that
the only relevant inquiry in the Rule of Reason is into the impact
of the restraint on competitive conditions, "whether the challenged
agreement is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses
competition."'
7
Even if the individual salary cap were analyzed under the Rule
of Reason, it would not be likely to survive. Although the Rule of
Reason as defined in Chicago Board of Trade permits a lengthy
list of considerations,' the individual salary cap's suppression of
competition through the severe market diminution available to
players outweighs any alleged "promotion" of competition. After
learning of the details of the agreement, Kevin Willis, a center for
the Toronto Raptors, said, "Guys can still make $14 million, and
that's a lot of money. If you can't live off that, something's
wrong."'79 Without denying the exceedingly understated truth of
Willis' comment, a market restraint is a market restraint; while
anyone should be able to live off $14 million, many players in the
league, including all-stars Karl Malone and Scottie Pippen, rea-
sonably believed that their market value had and would increase
above $14 million, and expected to take advantage of that mar-
ket.1's"
174. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
175. Id. at 688.
176. Id. at 690.
177. Id. at 691.
178. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
179. What They're Saying About the Settlement, ORLANDO SENTiNEL, Jan. 7, 1999,
at C4.
180. See Richard Aim, NBA Players' Salaries Now Have Fewer Zeros, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Feb. 13, 1999, at IF.
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Like Hollywood, professional sports is an entertainment busi-
ness: "Big stars get millions, while most get union scale."'' How-
ever, whereas Mr. Malone could have expected to receive offers
from teams willing to pay him upwards of $20 million, his artifi-
cially-imposed market worth is now $14 million. Not coinciden-
tally, the "new" market worth for Scottie Pippen also happens to be
$14 million, while the market worth for an Allen Iverson or a
Stephon Marbury, or any player for that matter, is similarly
stunted. NBA teams will conveniently have a wide variety of play-
ers available at their disposal, all for the same predetermined price.
General managers will no longer have to juggle different players'
salary demands, since the "demands" of all players within a certain
range will all be the same. Similarly, players will no longer be able
to consider different salary offers, since teams are likely to extend
the exact same salary as one another. "With maximums set on sala-
ries and stricter salary cap rules," one NBA team owner noted,
"teams bidding for free agents in many cases basically will be of-
fering the same salary."' 2 The convenience and ease with which
the NBA has coordinated and manipulated its labor pool is an ex-
ample of thinly-veiled collusion, and it is corrupt in every re-
spect.'83 It is also contrary to public policy, unreasonably restrain-
ing the freedom of individuals to seek employment, and it offends
the conscience to direct players to support weak franchises by re-
stricting their own right to bargain for higher salaries. "The heart
of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of
competition,' and the implications of the individual salary cap
are repugnant to the national antitrust policy of maintaining free
and open markets.
181. See Floyd Norris, N.B.A. War Could Last a Long Time, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 21,
1998, at A24.
182. Tim Kawakami, The Healing Begins... Season to Begin Feb. 5, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 1999, at DI.
183. In the mid-1980s, Major League Baseball team owners were found guilty of
collusion after agreeing not to extend offers to free agents playing on other teams, which
illegally decreased salaries. The owners were consequently forced to pay $87 million. See
Stephen L. Willis, A Critical Perspective on Baseball; Collusion Decisions, 1 SETON
HALL J. SPORT L. 109 (1991).
184. National Soc. of Prof'l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695
(1978)(quoting Standard Oil v. F.T.C., 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951))
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The primary justification for the individual salary cap proffered
by the NBA has been that it is necessary to hinder the otherwise-
unstoppable escalation in player salaries.185 This defense, however,
is dangerously misleading, confusing the harm for the cause. The
supposed achievement of this objective was celebrated upon the
announcement of the agreement. "In the modem sports world, this
answers the question, 'When will it stop?'," said one NBA execu-
tive, "It's stopped."'86 A hard cap does not "slow" player salaries: it
builds a brick wall. Even so, ironically, the payrolls of those eco-
nomically-weak teams on whose behalf the salary caps are alleged
do not often approach the team salary cap amount, nor are those
teams likely to sign many players to $14 million. Rather, the result
of the individual salary cap will be increased profits for big-market
teams, rescuing strong market forces from the "nuisance" of pay-
ing players their market worth, teams which may retain the serv-
ices of those players all the while. And yet, even with an artifi-
cially-deflated labor market, it is not difficult to predict that NBA
owners will continue to compete with each other to acquire the
services of talented players, the real reason behind escalating sala-
ries.
It is a fundamental principle of economics that any interference
with a market will result in the emergence of a black market; 87 in
the NBA, black markets manifest themselves through owners de-
vising ways to beat the salary cap, beat the system, and eventually
beat each other.88 For certain NBA owners, therefore, the cost in
acquiring a highly-paid player is clear: salary. The benefits of win-
ning a high-stakes bidding war, however, go far beyond the
player's skills on the court, but include media exposure and atten-
tion, increased fan attendance and interest, and a much more valu-
able sense of triumph, not necessarily on the court, but at the very
least, at the bargaining table, in the media and elsewhere. Team
owners became team owners through competitive business prac-
tices. Once they achieve the status of team owner, they are neither
185. See Fatsis, supra note 3, at A3.
186. Id.
187. See Andrew Zimbalist, Let the Market Rule the Basketball Court, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 10, 1998, at A22.
188. See id.
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willing nor able to "turn down" their competitiveness in acquiring
players, regardless of league rules or agreements. 89 In response to
the news of the NBA-NBPA agreement, one commentator said that
"[t]he fun part of recent sports labor negotiations has been that the
owners insist they have to have caps, and when they get them, they
compete to see who can be first to circumvent the cap."' In sum,
in the battle of "overinflated egos,.., emotion and adrenaline,"' 9'
basketball players are nothing more than $9-, $11- and $14-million
pawns.
"It's a Catch-22," admitted Jerry Colangelo, owner of the
Phoenix Suns and baseball's Arizona Diamondbacks. "Players al-
ways say, 'We didn't put a gun to your head to pay us that money.'
But there's tremendous pressure for us to pay it, from fans and
from media."'9' Indeed, in no city in the country does a profes-
sional sports team constitute a "dominant" business, yet both team
owners and players are bestowed with the status and attention usu-
ally reserved only for major celebrities. 19' As public figures, team
owners receive the benefit of attention from the public. In return,
they owe a quasi-duty of service to the public in large- and small-
markets alike. 94 George Steinbrenner, owner of baseball's New
York Yankees, explained his responsibility most simply: "I've got
to deliver a great product to New York." 95 Ownership in every city
is pressured by vox populi, local media and fans, to invest as heav-
ily in possible in the team, and team owners are vilified at any sign
of hesitation. New owners interested in making a "grand entrance"
are particularly susceptible to such public pressure.
Team owners do not become team owners through naivete,
however, and in exchange for the burden imposed upon them,
189. See Richard Aim, Even With NBA Settlement, Business of Basketball Uncer-
tain, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 7, 1999, at 7B.
190. Murray Chass, In Final Staredown, Players Take the Hit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
1999, at D5.
191. Del Jones, Usually, Everybody Loses in Lockout, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 1999, at
3B.
192. Ian O'Connor, Baseball Salaries Out of Control, Gannett News Service, Dec.
3, 1998.
193. See Fuhr, supra note 84, at 225.
194. See id.
195. O'Connor, supra note 192.
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many owners use their teams and any attention or publicity the
team receives to promote themselves. Indeed, the individual arro-
gance of professional sports team owners has been called "one of
life's great certainties.' 9 6 "You're either going to be a have or a
have-not," said Colangelo, asserting the outlook of a select number
of team owners. "I didn't get into this business to be a have-not.
' 97
Similarly, the alleged "mission" of another owner in purchasing a
sports team was "to get the important people of the world to know
who he is."'' Mr. Steinbrenner, whose Yankee ownership has
earned him both notoriety and adulation in equal measure, once
said, "when you're a shipbuilder, nobody pays attention to you.
But when you own [a sports team], they do, and I love it."' 99 While
owners of big-market teams, those accused of buying up talented
players and dominating the free-agent market, are exceptional,2°° in
the case of professional sports team owners, the exception is in-
dicative of the rule. To be sure, there is nothing wrong with expo-
sure and attention received through the self-promotion implied
within highly-publicized bidding wars. Such indulgences, how-
ever, do not deserve exemption from antitrust law. By extension,
disciplining such behavior cannot reasonably be interpreted as a
legitimate business purpose, and so even under the Rule of Reason,
the individual salary cap should not survive antitrust scrutiny.
2. The Per Se Rule
It is still more likely that the hard individual salary cap would
be examined under the per se rule because of the inherent price-
fixing element involved. This rule is applied where the practice in
question appears to be one that would always, or almost always,
196. George Vecsey, Economics 101: Baseball Owners' Egos Would Ease the Lux-
ury Tax, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 1995, at C4.
197. O'Connor, supra note 192.
198. Fuhr, supra note 84, at 224.
199. Id.
200. While most big-market team owners will spend extravagant amounts of money
to acquire talented players, George Steinbrenner is admittedly exceptional in his own
right. "It's worth remembering, that under Steinbrenner we tend to operate on the theory
that no one is unsignable," said one Yankee scout, allegedly trying to lure former Denver
Broncos quarterback John Elway away from football. PLAY BALL!, 29 (1995).
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restrict competition and decrease output.2 ' These agreements, ex-
emplified most commonly in market allocation and price-fixing
schemes, have a "pernicious effect" on competition without "any
redeeming virtue," and because of the public policies against such
practices, may be adjudicated irrespective of any alleged justifica-
tion.2 °2 Because in instances of price-fixing, condemnation is meted
so swiftly, courts have sought excuse to apply the Rule of Reason
or some other means of antitrust analysis, reserving use of the un-
compromising per se rule for only those restraints which are
"plainly anticompetitive."2 °3 The individual salary cap, even if it
was agreed upon between the NBA and the NBPA, is strikingly,
shamelessly, "plainly anticompetitive."
According to the Sherman Act, price-fixing arrangements are
found "if the range within which purchases or sales will be made is
agreed upon.., if they are to be uniform, or if by various formulae
they are related to market prices."' °4 In United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil,25 the Supreme Court explained what distinguishes
those practices which deserve review under the Rule of Reason
from those subject to the per se rule. 206 In per se cases, either the
purpose or the effect of the market restraint must be "aimed at
price manipulation or the control of market prices," ultimately
manifested through "any combination which tampers with price
structures."2°7 The application of the per se rule was expanded in
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,"" in which a group
of physicians established maximum fees which they would charge
for medical services. While price-fixing schemes had characteristi-
cally been conducted to establish minimum prices, the Supreme
Court ruled that price-fixing agreements could not escape per se
condemnation on the ground that they were horizontal and fixed
201. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1,
19-20 (1979) (citations omitted).
202. See Northern P. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
203. See National Soc. of Prof'l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978).
204. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
205. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
206. Id. at 154.
207. Id. at 217.
208. 457 U.S. 332 (1987).
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maximum prices.'09 Although the physicians' agreement, similar to
that undertaken by the engineers in Professional Engineers, was
argued to be in the public interest, the Court still found that it was
a per se violation of the Sherman Act.1 Whereas the practice in
Professional Engineers dealt with bidding procedures (as opposed
to actual prices), the Supreme Court ruled in Arizona that it was
not authorized to judge whether a case of actual price-fixing was
justified or not. 21 The Court ruled that it was not within its power
to change the per se rule, only to abide by it, a decision which was
rooted in "economic prediction, judicial convenience and business
certainty." ' The Court returned to the unrelenting conclusion in-
trinsic to the per se rule, that the anticompetitive potential of any
price-fixing scheme mandated "facial invalidation," even if certain
alleged justifications might be offered for some such arrange-
ments.21 3
The NBA's individual salary cap is so clearly anticompetitive
in its attempt to control the market, and so far removed from any
rational business purpose, that it is an exemplary model of a price-
fixing arrangement deserving of per se analysis. The acknowl-
edged motivation behind the individual salary cap, limiting the
salaries of players, can only be achieved permissibly through the
curbing of the fierce bidding wars of NBA owners, and disciplin-
ing the owners themselves. The undue economic encumbrance of
professional basketball players in an attempt to temper the behav-
ior of their spendthrift magnates is irrational, unreasonable, unfair
and unlawful. Although, it is difficult to argue conscientiously
against market restraints for individuals earning upwards of $14
million, limiting these individuals to any amount violates the col-
lective conscience embodied in the Sherman Act. The "Magna
Carta of free enterprise" 214 must be equally available to one and all,
and it must be employed to defend against any unreasonable mar-
ket restraint. The NBA's individual salary cap is precisely that, an
209. Id. at 347.
210. Id. at 356.
211. Id. at 351.
212. Id. at 354.
213. Id. at 351.
214. United States v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
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unreasonable market restraint, and must succumb to federal anti-
trust policy.
III. BUILDING A BETTER MOUSETRAP: BASEBALL'S "LUXURY TAx"
AS THE OPTIMAL PLAYER RESTRAINT
The idea of the salary cap was considered by Major League
Baseball ("MLB") in order to protect baseball's own small-market
teams like Milwaukee and Minnesota from having their talented
free agents lured away by the big-market teams in New York, Los
Angeles and elsewhere. After adamant opposition to the salary cap
by the Major League Baseball Players' Association ("MLBPA"),
the union representing professional baseball players, and after suf-
fering the Strike of 1994,215 the owners suggested a "luxury tax," a
"poor man's salary cap. 216 Under the luxury tax, a club's payroll
would be taxed if it exceeded a certain amount, and the collected
funds would be redistributed among small-market teams in order to
increase their ability to sign high-priced players. The MLBPA ini-
tially viewed this proposal as a salary cap in disguise, since clubs
would be reluctant to sign free agents if they had to pay a tax in
addition to the players' salaries. However, after the Strike of 1994
and federal intervention,"' the MLBPA agreed in theory to the
215. To be sure, considering its history, it is almost laughable to look to Major
League Baseball for an exemplary model of anything related to labor relations. Despite
an increase in player salaries of more than 2,000 percent over a twenty-year period and an
average salary of $1.57 million in 1999, not a single collective bargaining agreement has
been signed without a strike or lockout since 1972. Due to "the Strike of 1994," the
league's most recent - and most damaging - labor strife, dubbed "baseball's Hundred
Years War," the league had to cancel 686 regular season games between 1994 and 1995,f
as well as the 1994 World Series, the "Fall Classic," for the first time in 90 years. The
strike was so damaging that only after the success of interleague play and record-
breaking performances by sluggers like Mark McGwire of the St. Louis Cardinals and the-
Chicago Cubs' Sammy Sosa has attendance begun to approach pre-strike levels. After,
playing two seasons under the terms of the expired collective bargaining agreement,
MLB and the MLBPA finally reached an agreement in November, 1996, and the luxury'
tax emerged from beneath the rubble.
216. Murray Chass, Yankees to Pay $4.4 Million as Lion's Share of Teams' 1997
Luxury Tax, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 25, 1997, at C6.
217. On January 26, 1995, President Clinton ordered mediator Bill Usery to bring,
both sides of the baseball strike back to the bargaining table. Ultimately, Usery recom-
mended a 50 percent tax on payrolls over $40 million, a proposal much closer to the
owners' position than to the players', and because of the likely impact such a measure
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adoption of the luxury tax. On November 26, 1996, the owners fi-
nally approved the collective bargaining agreement. After a total
loss of more than a billion dollars resulting from the labor strife
which had plagued baseball since August 12, 1994, there was labor
peace in baseball. Within that agreement, baseball established the
ideal (at least in theory) player restraint, the luxury tax.
The luxury tax works as follows: the five teams with the high-
est payrolls above a certain threshold - in 1997, it was $51 million,
$55 million in 1998, and $58.9 million in 1999218 - must pay a
"tax" on the excess amount; the tax rate was 35 percent in 1997
and 1998, and 34 percent in 1999.219 The tax is added to a revenue-
sharing fund,221 which is then redistributed among 13 small-market
teams such as the Montreal Expos and the Kansas City Royals.
Therefore, in 1999, for example, the New York Yankees paid $4.8
million in luxury tax on a total payroll of $92 million; while the
total revenue-sharing assessments have yet to be calculated, the
Montreal Expos benefited the most under revenue sharing in 1998,
in the amount of $13 million.2 In all, upwards of $140 million will
would have on the salaries of free agents, one which the players most likely would have
found to be unacceptable. See ROGER ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES, 189 (1998).
218. According to the terms of the MLB agreement, no luxury tax will be in place
for the 2000 season, and the players may elect to extend the agreement without a tax to
2001. Considering the history between the parties, however, the issue of player restraints
will invariably be revisited during the collective bargaining sessions in 2001.
219. To clarify, team owners would prefer a higher tax on payrolls, which would be
more likely to deter teams from spending money, and would increase the total amount of
revenue redistributed under the plan; conversely, the players' union would prefer a low
tax rate, which would provide as little resistance as possible to owners willing to sign free
agents.
220. The luxury tax system is Major League Baseball's equivalent to the NBA's
salary cap, and is therefore the only provision that will be considered here. The revenue-
sharing plan as a whole redistributes funds received not only from the luxury tax on team
payroll, but also from revenue from television and media sources and ticket sales, among
other sources of incomes, as well as a 2.5% tax on players salaries paid by the players
themselves. While players' salaries are criticized by the media most frequently for caus-
ing the competitive disparity which player restraints are intended to balance, team payroll
is a minor consideration in terms of some teams' revenues. Local media rights primarily
fuel the Grand Canyonesque gap in revenue between Major League Baseball teams. In
1998, for example, the Montreal Expos earned a total of $35 million, $5 million of which
was from local media deals; the New York Yankees took in $175 million, $70 million of
which was from the media.
221. See Murray Chass, The Haves Have It and the Nots Don't, N.Y. TIMES, April
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be collected and redistributed among baseball's small-market
teams in 2000.222 While teams are not required to reinvest the
shared revenue in more-talented players, small-market teams may
increase their payrolls in order to field a better, more-competitive
team and eventually increase their revenue independent of the lux-
ury tax.22" The deal is relatively good for players, as well, in that
little salary restraint is likely: big-market owners are not precluded
from signing high-priced players, while small-market owners are
partially compensated, and thus gain strength themselves in the
bidding war over talented players as well 24
From a legal perspective, the luxury tax is not nearly as anti-
competitive as the NBA's salary cap, as owners are free to spend
as much money as they like on players, with the understanding that
they will "pay to play," and will themselves bear the cost for their
excesses. Whereas a salary cap prohibits a team from spending
more than a set amount, the luxury tax only inhibits clubs from
spending more than a certain amount, thus creating a brake, as -op-
posed to a wall, for excessive salaries. 5 Through this formula, the
luxury tax system implemented by Major League Baseball redis-
tributes payroll funds between teams, making the league more
competitive without crippling the earning potential of the players,
the game's feature attraction.
Admittedly, the luxury tax is not without its problems, and has
been criticized as ineffective against deterring big-spending clubs
like the New York Yankees and the Los Angeles Dodgers from
226throwing exorbitant amounts of money at players. 6 Indeed, in
1997, the first year of the luxury tax system, the teams with the top
five payrolls - the New York Yankees, Baltimore Orioles, Cleve-
land Indians, Florida Marlins and Atlanta Braves - all made the
playoffs, while none of the nine clubs with payrolls under $32 mil-
4, 1999, at sec. 8, p. 2.
222. See Tracy Ringolsby, Owners Serious About Relocation, DENVER ROCKY
MOUNTAiN NEws, April 21, 1999, at 7C.
223. See Staudohar, supra note 63, at 6.
224. One observer noted the irony of an arrangement in which "a club can use the
money it receives from the other club to compete against that club for players in the open
market." Fuhr, supra note 83, at 224.
225. See ABRAMS, supra note 216, at 199.
226. See Fuhr, supra note 84, at 224.
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lion had even a winning record. More recently, the Dodgers and
Yankees alone account for four of baseball's top 10 salaries in
2000.27 Similarly, six players all have contracts worth more than
the $75 million being sought from bidders to buy the Royals. In
their entirety, these figures suggest that certain owners will treat
the luxury tax "as just some annoying (but in its own way prideful)
assessment down at the country club." 8
Indeed, the primary concern is that, even with the limited reve-
nue sharing which exists, the revenue of big-market teams is so
substantial that they can afford the tax, and will ultimately "treat
the luxury tax like a jaywalking ordinance., 229 Baseball owners -
or, for that matter, team owners in any professional sport - will
never stop spending money. If they want a relief pitcher in August,
a power hitter in the off-season, or a one-time superstar to produce
a champion, team owners will spend the money, luxury tax or no
luxury ta23
Several big-market owners, those primarily responsible for
contributing to the revenue-sharing fund, have returned fire,
claiming that the real problem in baseball is not between the
"haves" and the "have-nots," but between the "do somethings" and
the "do nothings," and successful businessmen do not reward their
competitors for doing nothing. The luxury tax ostensibly creates a
disincentive for winning, as teams in large markets (and competi-
tive, financially-successful teams in small markets) are penalized
for their success, and are forced to compensate other teams for
227. The Dodgers' Kevin Brown and Shawn Green make $15 and $14 million per
year, respectively, while the Yankees' Bernie Williams and David Cone earn $12.5 and
$12 million per year, respectively. The Yankees are also expected to sign shortstop Derek
Jeter to a contract worth a record $17 million per annum, but could not close the deal be-
fore baseball's arbitration deadline, so Jeter signed a one-year contract for $10 million.
See Baseball's Top Contracts, USA TODAY, February 11, 2000, at 4C.
228. Vecsey, supra note 196, at C4.
229. John Henderson, Tax is No Luxury to Conduciveness of Trading, DENVER
PosT, March 29, 1997, at 2D. "'he present system doesn't share enough revenue," said
Andrew Zimbalist, an economist at Smith College and author of 'Baseball and Billions.'
"The Yankees give the Expos $11 million, which is better than giving them nothing,
which is what they'd get in the NBA or in the NHL. But it still leaves a huge gap." Jeff
Gordon, How Do Teams Go From Cellar to Stellar?, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Oct. 24,
1999, at Dl.
230. See Vecsey, supra note 196, at C4.
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their shortcomings, problems in which the successful teams played
no direct role.
Owners have expressed concern over a "welfare system" for
professional sports teams, supporting clubs in markets which can-
not support the teams independently. 3' This criticism of the luxury
tax is echoed by the players' union, player agents, and the players
themselves, who are not in favor of any player restraint. Opponents
of the salary cap argue that, historically, baseball progresses cycli-
cally, with today's perennial losers becoming tomorrow's World
Series champions.232
One suggestion to achieve competitive parity between teams,
instead of focusing on market size, is to provide incentives for
small-market teams to reinvest the proceeds from revenue sharing
back into their rosters. Currently, teams that receive money may
use it to improve their bottom line, not their starting lineup, re-
sulting in little or no effect on the competitiveness of the team they
put on the field.233 Inferior teams should have a financial incentive
attached to the luxury tax to improve their records and to make
competition closer. 34 This can be accomplished in a number of
ways, such as only compensating those teams that maintain a pay-
roll of at least 85% of the league average,"'3 for example, or re-
ducing the amount of money received by teams that perform below
231. "If I were sitting in another city, you'd say I might feel differently," said
Steinbrenner, who voted in favor of the luxury tax although he does not believe that his
Yankees should have to compensate the Expos. "No. I'd get busy and figure out how I
could improve what I'm doing... You can't say, 'Well, let's all share everything equal,'
or else we should be over in Russia. And it didn't work over there." Hal Bodley & Erik
Brady, Baseball's New Caste System, USA TODAY, April 2, 1999, at IC. "Seattle is a
classic case of a team that was a have-not and became a have," said Jerry McMorris,
owner of the Colorado Rockies. "I still struggle [with] how long and how hard Seattle
and Colorado should support Montreal and Minnesota." Larry Stone, In Game of Inches,
Gaps Widen, SEATrLE TimEs, Feb. 15, 1998, at D1.
232. "In the middle 80's, Kansas City, Minnesota and Oakland were all winners,
[while] Baltimore, Cleveland, and Atlanta were all losers," said player agent Scott Boras.
"It isn't about big-market, small-market. It's about good decisions, bad decisions."
Bodley, supra note 231, at IC.
233. See id.
234. See Gary S. Becker, Baseball: How to Level the Playing Field, Bus. WK., Oct.
10, 1994, at 26.
235. See Zimbaist, supra note 187.
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a certain level. 236 Another remedy would be to stagger the tax for
both the high-spending and low-spending teams. Under this plan,
similar to federal income tax, the more a team spent above a cer-
tain limit, the higher the tax rate would be for that excess amount.
Conversely, the fund would be pro-rated for teams below a certain
payroll level, so that the more games a team lost, the less money
they would receive under revenue sharing. This would provide an
incentive for teams to win until the very end of the season, par-
ticularly those teams normally eliminated from playoff contention
by August. In all, the percentages and calculations of the luxury
tax, whether how much certain teams contribute or how much
other teams are compensated, may be amended or adjusted without
the chaos or fanfare - or legal repercussions - of the union decerti-
fication threatened as a result of the NBA's salary cap.
In contrast to the NBA's imposition of the salary cap upon its
teams, several small-market baseball teams have taken responsi-
bility for their own competitiveness, independent of league action.
In large part, these teams have emerged as both competitive as well
as successful financially. Teams in Baltimore, Cleveland and Ar-
lington, Texas, for example, have all built new stadiums to attract
fans, increase attendance and ultimately increase revenue. With
amenities such as spacious luxury boxes and ample room for cor-
porate advertising, these teams have increased their revenue even
more, and have been able to sign high-priced free agents in order
to field competitive teams consistently. Small-market teams like
Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, and Detroit, among others, are following
suit with the construction of new stadiums, a strategy to increase
revenue which has worked so well that teams in big markets like
New York and Boston are now pushing for new stadiums of their
own, in an ironic twist, to keep pace with the likes of Seattle and
Tampa Bay. In all, MLB Commissioner Bud Selig predicts that
as many as twelve new stadiums will be built by 2003, which
would generate an additional $475 million in revenue and which
would in all likelihood abate any need for a salary-cap-type provi-
236. See Becker, supra note 234.
237. See David Lewis, Rudy: Stadium a Super Idea, DAILY NEWS (NEw YORK),
April 12, 1996, at 26; Anthony Flint, Ballpark Plan Seen Favored, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
27, 1999, at DI.
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sion.
Amid the debate and discussion over the luxury tax, revenue
sharing, the salary cap and other player restraints "essential" to
professional sports leagues, not everyone is convinced that the pre-
dicaments of magnate team owners are as dire as the owners sug-
gest. Paul Beeston, current CEO and former vice president of the
Toronto Blue Jays, once said, "[u]nder generally accepted ac-
counting principles, I can turn a $4 million profit into a $2 million
loss and I can get every national accounting firm to agree with
me." 238 By manipulating the team's ledgers, owners may employ
"creative accounting" techniques to pay themselves salaries and
other fees considerably above market level.239 Similar ploys have
been used by team owners who, in addition to the team, may own
the stadium in which the team plays, and pocket rent costs, or they
may own the media ventures which broadcast the team's games,
and pocket broadcasting fees.""
This line of criticism is bolstered by the fact that professional
sports leagues have avoided adopting restrictions on investments in
player development, coaches or executive talent, all of which
would balance competition, although none would reduce bother-
some labor costs in the form of players' salaries. 24' In fact, despite
all the "poor mouthing" and complaints about lack of balanced
competition, 24 different teams reached the playoffs in the
1990s. 2 42 Economist Roger Noll explained in short why team own-
ers in baseball and other professional sports complain so frequently
about any imbalance in competition on the field: "To get
mooneeey. ' 43
238. Stone, supra note 231.
239. George Steinbrenner allegedly rewarded himself with a $25 million consulting
fee for negotiating the Yankees' cable contract. See Fuhr, supra note 84, at 231.
240. See id. at 232.
241. Stephen Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REv. 643,680 (1989).
242. Apologies to fans of the Anaheim Angels, Kansas City Royals, Milwaukee
Brewers, and Detroit Tigers (all of whom reached the playoffs during the 1980s), as well
as the Montreal Expos (who were in first place in the National League East and poised to
make the playoffs at the time of the players' strike in 1994) and the Tampa Bay Devil
Rays (who have only been playing since 1998). COMPtErE BASEBALL REcORD BOOK, 244
(Craig Carter ed., 2000):
243. See Stone, supra note 231, at Dl.
[10:521
NBA'S DEAL WITH THE DEVIL
Thus, while local media have not provided small-market teams
with the same level of revenue as their big-market opponents in
New York or Los Angeles, increased attendance and other sources
of revenue have made up much of the difference.2" Furthermore,
professional athletes have as many geographical preferences as
lawyers, teachers, machinists, or members of any profession.
While salary is a factor, some people want to live on the coast,
some people in the Midwest and some in the South. In making em-
ployment decisions, professional athletes, like members of any
other profession, consider myriad factors, including family back-
ground, overall educational and vocational opportunities.24 5
In all, the luxury tax devised by Major League Baseball is far
superior to the salary cap in balancing the competition between
big- and small-market teams. The luxury tax does not directly af-
fect the salaries of players like the salary cap, and thus does not
raise the same antitrust issues. Under the tax, team owners are
permitted to spend as much money as they desire, with the com-
mon understanding that they will pay through the nose for doing
so, and compensate the small-market teams in the league. In turn,
those teams will be able to field more competitive teams and at-
tract more fans to increase their revenue independent of the reve-
nue-sharing plan. The luxury tax does not limit the salaries of indi-
vidual players like the salary cap, and is therefore not nearly as
anticompetitive and as stifling of the players' earning potential.
Any alleged ineffectiveness on the part of the luxury tax is merely
a matter of degree: it would work better if the money were distrib-
uted differently, or if different percentages were applied to differ-
ent payroll amounts. Clearly, however, the luxury tax promotes
competition more reasonably than the salary cap, and is a promis-
ing step towards balancing the competition essential to profes-
sional sports.
244. See Becker, supra note 234, at 26.
245. See Ross, supra note 241, at 682. Mark McGwire (St. Louis), Ken Griffey, Jr.
(Cincinnati) and Tony Gwynn (San Diego) are only three of baseball's biggest names
who could have commanded salaries far higher than those they currently earn, but pre-
ferred the comforts of a small-market team.
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CONCLUSION
"It's Deja Vid All Over Again."2
Slowly but surely, the game of basketball is increasing in stat-
ure. On the court, many signs indicate that the NBA has been able
to recapture most of its fan base and restore its popularity, a par-
ticularly noteworthy accomplishment in barely a year's time since
the resolution of its labor dispute. 47 In court, through "that other
great American pastime, litigation,"2' basketball is rapidly gaining
on baseball's unique antitrust exemption,249 with a growing number
of cases shielding teams and the league from antitrust action.
Ironically, however, just when the Supreme Court has expanded
the antitrust exception for professional sports in Brown, Congress
decided to confine baseball's "unrealistic, inconsistent [and] illogi-
cal" 250 exemption.25' Thus, in spite of judicial endorsement, the
Brown holding returns professional sports to an era in which the
professional baseball establishment was able to hold players in
"involuntary servitude." 2 In Flood v. Kuhn,"3 the Supreme Court
held that Curt Flood, an outfielder for the St. Louis Cardinals, had
not been unreasonably restrained by his employer, the Cardinals,
since he could always exercise his option to retire, in effect, to quit
his job. The Court held that so long as a baseball player remained
in the "industry" of professional baseball, however, he was at the
disposal of the league and its teams.2m The Brown decision lurches
246. Dave Anderson, The Games He Played And The Things He Said, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 1999, at Sec. 13, p. 4 (quoting Yogi Berra).
247. Three teams sold out every home game during the abbreviated, 50-game 1999
season. Leaguewide, attendance slipped just 2%, and nearly half the teams averaged
larger crowds this season than last. See Mark Hyman, Another Ruined Season That
Wasn't, Bus. WK., June 7, 1999, at 40.
248. Jacobs, supra note 58, at 3.
249. Apart from baseball, "[o]ther professional sports operating interstate, football,
boxing, basketball and presumably hockey and golf, are not so exempt." Flood v. Kuhn,
407 U.S. 258, 282-283 (1972).
250. Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445,452 (1957).
251. For details of the Curt Flood Act of 1998 and its interaction with the decision
in Brown v. Pro Football, see Curt Flood Act Revokes Antitrust Exemption For Practices
That Affect Employment Of Major League Baseball Players, ENTERTAINMENT LAw
REPORTER, December, 1998.
252. Flood, 407 U.S. at 265-66.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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in that direction, permitting sports leagues to disable national anti-
trust policy and manhandle their players, so long as they comport
with certain objectives of labor law.
The growing national passion for breakaway slam dunks, or
500-foot home runs, must be tempered, not in the stands but in the
courtroom and at the bargaining table, by a sense of justice in favor
of those individuals performing those extraordinary feats. Instead,
the NBA's team and individual salary caps punish those not re-
sponsible for the offenses intended to be disciplined. How the
Brown holding will be applied to the provisions of the NBA's col-
lective bargaining agreement remains to be seen. In light of the
Supreme Court's sweeping exemption, it is unlikely that any player
would be so bold as to try to find out. Alternatively, under a sys-
tem like baseball's luxury tax, no antitrust challenge would ever be
necessary. In the face of baseball's mighty reserve clause, Curt
Flood argued, albeit in vain, that "a well-paid slave is still a
slave." 2*' - With its team salary cap and its individual salary cap, the
NBA is regrettably headed in the same direction, towards well-paid
slavery.
255. Winston, Fightingfor his Freedom, NAT'LL. J., Aug. 15, 1988, at 13.
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